Brexit Blues

Reading the latest coverage of the Brexit farce combined with the inter-related Conservative leadership contest, I am reminded of Oscar Wilde’s description of fox hunting:

“The unspeakable in pursuit of the uneatable”

Whichever candidate wins the Tory leadership race and, as a consequence, becomes the next UK Prime Minister, they will inevitably fail to deliver a satisfactory Brexit solution, simply because there is no consensus position.

But the underlying cause for this impasse is a series of flawed processes:

First, the promise made by previous Prime Minister David Cameron to hold a referendum on EU membership was flawed, if not highly disingenuous – because from the start, there were no terms of reference. Cameron chose to make it part of his manifesto pledge ahead of the 2015 general election campaign. Even at the time it felt like a desperate ploy to appease the mainly right-wing and Eurosceptic faction of the Conservative party. Despite being generally in favour of the UK remaining within the EU (but with “looser ties”), Cameron probably never expected that he would have to deliver on his referendum promise let alone lead the Brexit negotiations. Behind in the polls, the Tories were expected to lose the election. Instead, they won, but with a much reduced majority – which should have been the first warning sign that all was not going to be plain sailing with Cameron’s EU referendum pledge.

Second, the referendum question put to the electorate in 2016 was itself flawed. Cameron had originally talked about renegotiating the UK’s terms of EU membership, much like Margaret Thatcher had done with some considerable success in the 1980s. There was certainly no mention at all in Cameron’s January 2013 speech of a “No-deal Brexit”. However, the referendum question put to the voters was a stark, binary choice between “Remain” or “Leave”. As some have argued, the design of the referendum should have been enough to render it invalid: both because the voters were not given enough reliable data upon which to make an informed decision; and because there was no explanation or guidance as to what type of “Leave” (or “Remain”) outcome the government and Parliament would be obliged or expected to negotiate and implement. Simply put, the people did not and could not know what they were actually voting for (or against). I am not suggesting that the voters were ignorant, rather they were largely ill- or under-informed (although some would argue they were actually misinformed).

Third, the respective Leave and Remain campaigns in the 2016 referendum were both equally flawed. The Leave campaign was totally silent on their proposed terms of withdrawal (I certainly don’t recall the terms “Hard Brexit” or “No-deal Brexit” being used), and their “policy” was predicated on the magic number of “£350m a week“. And the Remain campaign failed to galvanize bipartisan support, and was totally hindered by the Labour leadership’s equivocation and ambivalence towards the EU (which has only deepened as Jeremy Corbyn refuses to confirm what his policy actually is).

Finally, the Parliamentary process to implement Brexit was flawed from the start. Cameron jumped ship and ending up passing the poisoned chalice to Theresa May. The latter had supported Remain, but now had to lead the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. However, rather than trying to build consensus and broker a truly bipartisan solution (this is not, after all, a simple, one-dimensional party political issue), May proved to be a stubborn, inflexible and thick-skinned operator. Now, there are threats to prorogue Parliament in the event that MPs vote against a No-Deal or Hard Brexit, if a negotiated agreement cannot be achieved by the October 31 deadline. May’s negotiation tactics have only resulted in deeply entrenched and highly polarised positions, while she ended up painting herself into a corner. Good luck to her successor, because if nothing else, Brexit is casting division and national malaise across the UK.

Next week: Pitch X’s WInter Solstice

 

Postscript on the Federal Election

Well, what just happened there? In a Federal election that was Labor’s to lose (based on all the published opinion polls), the opposition ended up conceding defeat within just a few hours of the ballot closing. Despite the negative national swing away from the Coalition, Labor suffered an even greater negative swing.

Although populist parties gained votes at the expense of the two major parties, they failed to pick up any seats – rather, Labor lost too many seats. The Greens held on to their one seat, while the balance held by other minor parties also remained the same. All of which enabled the Coalition to form majority government. Sure, there were some significant variations in each State (and the Coalition will have to rely on minority parties in the Senate), but overall Labor was the biggest loser.

Yet it was still a pretty close outcome, and as I expected, the deciding factor was Queensland (and Adani).

A key problem for Labor was that rather than beating up “the big end of town”, and advocating a form of class war (thru the implied politics of envy), it should have found a way to help the working population adapt to the reality of a changing economy. Plus, instead of just imposing a carbon tax, it should have offered more incentives to decarbonise.

Equally, during the campaign there was no discussion by either major party on the need for structural economic reforms around competition, productivity and the tangible outcomes of public services.

Labor has since pretty much abandoned key fiscal policies it took to the electorate, with its new leader claiming that the party must appeal to “aspirational Australians” (whatever that means). For me, this implies that people need to feel incentivised to contribute more, while also feeling they are able to keep more of what they earn, through their additional efforts. In fact, the new shadow finance minister has commented on the lack of productivity gains (reflected in large part by wage stagnation?). Whereas, the previous Labor leadership talked endlessly about “ordinary Australians” (whatever that means).

The re-elected Prime Minister, meanwhile, credited “quiet Australians” (whatever that means) for the Coalition’s success.

Somewhat worryingly, the Prime Minister described his win as a “miracle”, and has made a significant personal statement through his own churchgoing habits, while a former Labor Prime Minister said his party needed to “reconnect with people of faith”. The sacking of a leading sportsman for making bigoted comments on social media (because his religion wanted him to say those things) has led to a prominent Coalition senator to seek an administrative review of the decision, on the grounds that expressing religious views cannot be cause for dismissal. The consequence of such a position is that “religious freedoms” effectively protect hate speech. And there was I thinking that we lived in a secular country…

Both major parties have to overcome continuing and significant internal divisions in the wake of their respective election results. Labor’s factionalism has already been on display again with the way its uncontested leadership contest was stitched up in more murky back room deals. And the Coalition’s more conservative members from Queensland will be expecting huge rewards for having delivered the party a surprise win.

Whether or not Australia’s Federal poll result was another example of the populist trend that was started by the Brexit referendum, confirmed with Trump’s success, and now extended following the EU elections, is open to debate. But it’s clear that traditional assumptions concerning the western democratic process have been subverted, in large part by the arrogance and complacency of the very same political parties that have hitherto underpinned them, that were also forged by them, but which now appear willing to undermine them.

Next week: The Finnies