Or, more specifically, has disintermediation broken the business model?
Ever since the invention of compact cassettes in the 1960s and the arrival of the Walkman in the 1970s, pundits have been predicting the end of the music business (remember those “Home Taping Is Killing Music” campaign logos of the 1980s?) – a theory that look set to come true in the 1990s with the launch of mp3 players and peer-to-peer file sharing. Yet, rather like Mark Twain, the death of the record industry appears to be greatly exaggerated.
Most debate about the demise of the music industry is predicated on the impact of technology that facilitates music piracy, whereas in reality the business model has been broken as a consequence of digital disintermediation.
For most of its history, the recording industry was a model of vertical integration. The major record labels owned the content, the means of production (recording and manufacture), the publishing and licensing activities, the distribution channels – and in some cases, they even manufactured the hardware, owned the retail stores and promoted live concerts.
The 1970s began a rapid process of horizontal integration, as the major record labels merged with one another at such a rate that by the late 1990s there were really only four global companies – Sony, Warner, Universal and EMI. At various times, each of these companies has also been affiliated to substantial film, electronics and publishing interests – further proof of the vertical and horizontal integration.
The “Big Four” have now been reduced to just three with the sale of EMI to Universal. European Union Competition rules resulted in parts of the EMI group of labels being divested to Warner, and the music publishing division being sold to Sony/ATV Music Publishing.
EMI was probably the epitome of vertical integration – but over the years, it was forced to sell or close assets like its UK manufacturing plant and the HMV retail chain, and came close to selling off London’s Abbey Road Studios (a decision that was reversed following public outcry and reinforced by a heritage listing). Some observers blame poor business decisions and weak digital strategies for EMI’s demise, but I would argue that the highly integrated model has been found wanting, and EMI was a dinosaur that could no longer survive in its current form. For example, despite some errors of judgement (such as putting “Copy Control” software on their CD’s which affected their ability to play on personal computers), in many ways EMI was something of a pioneer in digital music – being one of the first major labels to remove DRM from its downloads, and licensing its content for streaming services.
Despite the rampant corporate contraction, the growth of digital download platforms and the expansion of music streaming services, it’s clear that record labels still have a role to play in developing and distributing new content. Independent labels, distributors and retailers continue to wax and wane according to the fortunes of the wider industry, and technology makes it even easier for artists to self-release their recordings direct to the customer – but record labels provide the financial and marketing support that are critical to commercial success, and other intermediaries (publishers, distributors, licensees, retailers, promoters, etc.) continue to add value to the supply chain.
In fact, just this week, Billboard has been running a poll on whether Universal and Sony should break away from their parent entertainment conglomerates – the theory being that the music labels represent greater value on their own, especially when unencumbered by ailing electronics and movie businesses. Results so far suggest that ownership does not matter so much as having the best strategies for, and access to, the means of content creation and distribution.
At the same time, the music industry is going through another round of vertical and horizontal integration and disintermediation, driven by new technology, new distribution platforms and new business models linked to the way we access and consume content. So, while Apple’s iTunes platform has been accused of anti-competitive practices in its dealings with content owners, it also faces competition from music streaming services like Spotify, Rdio and Pandora, and new content platforms like Twitter’s #music and Vine. And if sales of new CD’s (and even mp3 downloads) are reportedly declining, there is still healthy demand for live music events especially those linked to the marketing of established back catalogue titles, which is where record labels come into their own as curators of re-released and re-packaged content.
In conclusion, here are some random reasons why I think the music industry is actually in good health:
- Sales of vinyl records achieved a 15-year high in 2012
- The success of the international Record Store Day events has spawned an inaugural Cassette Store Day scheduled for next month
- L.Pierre has released the first ever album on Vine
- Beck released his last album only in printed song sheet form
- Universal has launched a crowdfunding model to re-release out-of-print vinyl (but only after independent labels started the trend)
- Content is still king – and investors are starting to look at liberating music assets from their parent companies
- SoundCloud continues to set the standard for user-defined music content (c.f. MySpace…)
- ISP’s, telcos and other distribution platforms are keen to acquire content assets
- Major record labels have realised they don’t do a good job of their own download stores (remember Sony’s Connect, for example?) – leave it to the experts!
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