State of the Music Industry…

Depending on your perspective, the music industry is in fine health. 2023 saw a record year for sales (physical, digital and streaming), and touring artists are generating more income from ticket sales and merchandising than the GDPs of many countries. Even vinyl records, CDs and cassettes are achieving better sales than in recent years!

On the other hand, only a small number of musicians are making huge bucks from touring; while smaller venues are closing down, meaning fewer opportunities for artists to perform.

And despite the growth in streaming, relatively few musicians are minting it from these subscription-based services, that typically pay very little in royalties to the vast majority of artists. (In fact, some content can be zero-rated unless it achieves a minimum number of plays.)

Aside from the impact of streaming services, there are two other related challenges that exercise the music industry: the growing use of Artificial Intelligence, and the need for musicians to be recognised and compensated more fairly for their work and their Intellectual Property.

With AI, a key issue is whether the software developers are being sufficiently transparent about the content sources used to train their models, and whether the authors and rights owners are being fairly recompensed in return for the use of their IP. Then there are questions of artistic “creativity”, authorial ownership, authenticity, fakes and passing-off when we are presented with AI-generated music. Generative music software has been around for some time, and anyone with a smart phone or laptop can access millions of tools and samples to compose, assemble and record their own music – and many people do just that, given the thousands of new songs that are being uploaded every day. Now, with the likes of Suno, it’s possible to “create” a 2-minute song (complete with lyrics) from just a short text prompt. Rolling Stone magazine recently did just that, and the result was both astonishing and dispiriting.

I played around with Suno myself (using the free version), and the brief prompt I submitted returned these two tracks, called “Midnight Shadows”:

Version 1

Version 2

The output is OK, not terrible, but displays very little in the way of compositional depth, melodic development, or harmonic structure. Both tracks sound as if a set of ready-made loops and samples had simply been cobbled together in the same key and tempo, and left to run for 2 minutes. Suno also generated two quite different compositions with lyrics, voiced by a male and a female singer/bot respectively. The lyrics were nonsensical attempts to verbally riff on the text prompt. The vocals sounded both disembodied (synthetic, auto-tuned and one-dimensional), and also exactly the sort of vocal stylings favoured by so many contemporary pop singers, and featured on karaoke talent shows like The Voice and Idol. As for Suno’s attempt to remix the tracks at my further prompting, the less said the better.

While content attribution can be addressed through IP rights and commercial licensing, the issue of “likeness” is harder to enforce. Artists can usually protect their image (and merchandising) against passing off, but can they protect the tone and timbre of their voice? A new law in Tennessee attempts to do just that, by protecting a singer’s a vocal likeness from unauthorised use. (I’m curious to know if this protection is going to be extended to Jimmy Page’s guitar sound and playing style, or an electronic musician’s computer processing and programming techniques?)

I follow a number of industry commentators who, very broadly speaking, represent the positive (Rob Abelow), negative (Damon Krukowski) and neutral (Shawn Reynaldo) stances on streaming, AI and musicians’ livelihood. For every positive opportunity that new technology presents, there is an equal (and sometimes greater) threat or challenge that musicians face. I was particularly struck by Shawn Reynaldo’s recent article on Rolling Stone’s Suno piece, entitled “A Music Industry That Doesn’t Sell Music”. The dystopian vision he presents is millions of consumers spending $10 a month to access music AI tools, so they can “create” and upload their content to streaming services, in the hope of covering their subscription fees….. Sounds ghastly, if you ask me.

Add to the mix the demise of music publications (for which AI and streaming are also to blame…), and it’s easy to see how the landscape for discovering, exploring and engaging with music has become highly concentrated via streaming platforms and their recommender engines (plus marketing budgets spent on behalf of major artists). In the 1970s and 1980s, I would hear about new music from the radio (John Peel), TV (OGWT, The Tube, Revolver, So It Goes, Something Else), the print weeklies (NME, Sounds, Melody Maker), as well as word of mouth from friends, and by going to see live music and turning up early enough to watch the support acts. Now, most of my music information comes from the few remaining print magazines such as Mojo and Uncut (which largely focus on legacy acts), The Wire (but probably too esoteric for its own good), and Electronic Sound (mainly because that’s the genre that most interests me); plus Bandcamp, BBC Radio 6’s “Freak Zone”, Twitter, and newsletters from artists, labels and retailers. The overall consequence of streaming and up/downloading is that there is too much music to listen to (but how much of it is worth the effort?), and multiple invitations to “follow”, “like”, “subscribe” and “sign up” for direct content (but again, how much of it is worth the effort?). For better or worse, the music media at least provided an editorial filter to help address quality vs quantity (even if much of it ended up being quite tribal).

In the past, the music industry operated as a network of vertically integrated businesses: they sourced the musical talent, they managed the recording, manufacturing and distribution of the content (including the hardware on which to play it), and they ran publishing and licensing divisions. When done well, this meant careful curation, the exercise of quality control, and a willingness to invest in nurturing new artists for several albums and for the duration of their career. But at times, record companies have self-sabotaged, by engaging in format wars (e.g., over CD, DCC and MiniDisc standards), by denying the existence of on-line and streaming platforms (until Apple and Spotify came along), and by becoming so bloated that by the mid-1980s, the major labels had to merge and consolidate to survive – largely because they almost abandoned the sustainable development of new talent. They also ignored their lucrative back catalogues, until specialist and independent labels and curators showed them how to do it properly. Now, they risk overloading the reissue market, because they lack proper curation and quality control.

The music industry really only does three things:

1) A&R (sourcing and developing new talent)

2) Marketing (promotion, media and public relations)

3) Distribution & Licensing (commercialisation).

Now, #1 and #2 have largely been outsourced to social media platforms (and inevitably, to AI and recommender algorithms), and #3 is going to be outsourced to web3 (micro-payments for streaming subscriptions, distribution of NFTs, and licensing via smart contracts). Whether we like it or not, and taking their lead from Apple and Spotify, the music businesses of the future will increasingly resemble tech companies. The problem is, tech rarely understands content from the perspective of aesthetics – so expect to hear increasingly bland AI-generated music from avatars and bots that only exist in the metaverse.

Meanwhile, I go to as many live gigs as I can justify, and brace my wallet for the next edition of Record Store Day later this month…

Next week: Reclaim The Night

 

 

 

More on Music Streaming

A coda to my recent post on music streaming:

Despite the growth in Spotify‘s subscribers (and an apparent shift from free to paid-for services), it seams that the company still managed to make a loss. Over-paying for high-profile projects can’t have helped the balance sheet either….

Why is it so hard for Spotify to make money? In part, it’s because streaming has decimated the price point for content. This price erosion began with downloads, and has accelerated with streaming – premium subscribers don’t bother to think about how little they are paying for each time they stream a song, they have just got used to paying comparatively little for their music, wherever and whenever they want it. So they are not even having to leave their screen or device to consume content – whereas, in the past, fixed weekly budgets and the need to visit a bricks and mortar shop meant record buyers were probably more discerning about their choices.

Paradoxically, the reduced cost of music production (thanks to cheaper recording and distribution technology) means there is more music being released than ever before. But there is a built-in expectation that the consumer price must also come down – and of course, with so much available content, there has to be a law of diminishing returns – both in terms of quality, and the amount of new content subscribers can listen to. (It would be interesting to know how many different songs or artists the average Spotify subscriber streams.)

While some artists continue to be financially successful in the streaming age (albeit backed up by concert revenue and merchandising sales), it means there is an awfully long tail of content that is rarely or never heard. Even Spotify has to manage and shift that inventory somehow, so that means marketing budgets and customer acquisition costs have to grow accordingly (even though some of the promotion expenses can be offloaded on to artists and their labels).

Not only is streaming eroding content price points, in some cases, it is also at risk of eroding copyright. Recently it was disclosed that Twitter (now X) is being sued by music companies for breach of copyright.

You may recall that just over 10 years ago, a service called Twitter Music was launched with much anticipation (if not much fanfare…). Interestingly, part of the idea was that Twitter Music users could “integrate” their Spotify, iTunes or Rdio (who…?) accounts. It was also seen as a way for artists to engage more directly with their audience, and enable fans to discover new music. Less than a year later, Twitter pulled the plug.

One conclusion from all of this is that often, even successful tech companies don’t really understand content. The classic case study in this area is probably Microsoft and Encarta, but you could include Kodak and KODAKOne – by contrast, I would cite News Corp and MySpace (successful content business fails to understand tech). I suppose Netflix (which started as a mail-order DVD rental business) is an example of a tech business (it gained patents for its early subscription tech) that has managed to get content creation right – and its recent drive to shut down password sharing looks like it is paying dividends.

Of all its contemporaries, Apple is probably the most vertically integrated tech and content company – it manufactures the platform devices, manages streaming services, and even produces film and TV content (but not yet music?). In this context, I would say Google is a close second (devices, streaming, dominates on-line advertising, but does not produce original content), with Amazon someway behind (although it has had a patchy experience with devices, it has a reasonable handle on streaming and content creation).

All of which makes it somewhat surprising that Spotify is running at a loss?

Next week: Digital Identity – Wallets are the key?

 

 

#SoundCloud app update fails Product Management 101

The Golden Rule of Product Management is ‘under-promise and over-deliver’ (otherwise known as ‘managing expectations’). If anyone needs a case study on how NOT to release a new app upgrade, SoundCloud is proving to be a rich source of material…..

Background image via SoundCloud - post-production editing by the author

Background image via SoundCloud – post-production editing by the author

Last week, SoundCloud broke the Golden Rule by releasing a new version of its iOS phone app before it was finished. It did so without telling its customers in advance – not even the paying subscribers. Only after a considerable backlash on Twitter and Facebook (and a growing number of 1-star ratings in the iTunes Store) did the company start addressing customer complaints, via a rather anodyne blog. Based upon user comments, this response has failed to placate subscribers. While SoundCloud admitted that the shiny new release was not the final product, it was unable to give any indication when the rollout will be completed.

For the uninitiated*, SoundCloud is to audio what YouTube is to video. It allows customers to upload audio files that can then be shared with and downloaded by the community of users. It is entirely powered by user defined content:

  • content created and uploaded by content creators, and
  • content curated by users (via re-posts, playlists and social media interaction).

Audio content takes the form of:

  • music, mixtapes, podcasts, radio programmes and spoken word contributions.

Social media content takes the form of:

  • likes, feedback comments, and data on the number of plays, likes, downloads, followers and re-posts.

Many content creators are Pro Users, who pay upwards of $70 a year for the privilege. In return, they get a platform for hosting and distributing their content, and access to a global community of listeners. However, unlike other music streaming services such as Spotify and Pandora, SoundCloud does not charge listeners (yet), nor does it carry 3rd party advertising or sponsored content (yet).

Although SoundCloud has been highly successful (thereby contributing to the decline of MySpace?), it faces a range of competitors – from Twitter Music and Bandcamp to Mixcloud and 8tracks (as well as the aforementioned subscription streaming services).

In recent months, there has been some industry speculation about SoundCloud’s next business move, mostly in relation to increased monetization. There has also been some commentary about copyright infringement, a new cookie policy, and access to SoundCloud’s back-end data by major record labels. Leaving aside the usual conspiracy theories (Big Brother is listening in on you), future commercial relationships with major labels could mean that record companies with more marketing budget than talent may be given preferred access to listeners’ accounts and activity, in order to promote the next generation of Lady Gaga wannabes. And this prospect has no doubt contributed to some concerns among the user community, especially content creators that fuel SoundCloud’s platform.

From the start, SoundCloud has done a couple of things really well (in addition to the widgets for embedding sound files in 3rd party websites, and a few other technical tools): first, it has made it easier to discover new music; and second, it has enabled thousands of independent and unknown musicians to get some public exposure. The mobile app has now seriously compromised both of these features, because a lot of the existing functionality has been removed or suppressed pending the ‘full’ release (admittedly, these functions are still supported on the desktop version).

In short, the new app release has created the impression that SoundCloud is focussing on listeners (rather than content creators) and plans to make it much easier for major labels to connect with consumers, thereby squeezing out the independent musicians, producers and labels who have helped to make SoundCloud successful in the first place.

*FOOTNOTE: Declaration of interest – I maintain a Pro User subscription to SoundCloud under my nom de musique.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Credit is due to ‘Do Androids Dance?’ (itself a beneficiary of the SoundCloud user community) for continuing to cover this developing story