Why is Customer Service still the Achilles’ heel for the Service Industry?

Recent experience has reinforced my deeply held belief that for many service providers, enhancing the customer experience is the last thing on their mind. But when customer service is possibly the one true competitive advantage you can have, why do so many service providers perform so badly when dealing with their own customers?

We know that competing on price alone can be a race to the bottom where nobody wins, and everyone loses. Competing on technology only gets you so far, especially as we operate in an increasingly open-source environment. And first-mover advantage is not always an option, unless you can quickly recoup the higher investment it takes to be a market leader from Day 1.

I also find it increasingly infuriating that nearly every service provider claims to be poring over their customer feedback, yet their service levels rarely improve. Not only are customers expected to be brand advocates (via social media, word-of-mouth marketing, testimonials, etc.), they are also expected to provide training material for the customer service department (see “Some gratuitous advice for customer service managers – 7 handy hints”).

Last week I had to visit the retail outlet of a major service provider in the communications sector. When I tried to explain how frustrating it is as a customer to discover that the company’s website has different information to what I was being given in-store, I got the following responses:

  • The website is nothing to do with in-store service, and is only there for information
  • It doesn’t matter what’s on the public website, counter staff can only go by the information displayed on their in-house computer terminal
  • If I wanted to pursue the matter, I would have to make a complaint (by phone, or on-line – not in-store)
  • If I was unhappy, I could cancel my purchase and get my money back (and presumably take my custom elsewhere?)

Not one to give in easily, I submitted a detailed complaint on-line. A few days later, I received a call from someone who said she represented the “On-line Support” team. She simply reiterated that the public website was only there “for guidance”, and that the on-line content was managed by a different department. The most accurate information could only be provided at the in-store point of sale. The representative also said she would e-mail the web team, but could not guarantee a response as “they don’t communicate with us” – and this is a major communications business!  (Not surprisingly, the person I spoke to could not appreciate the irony in this.)

Banks, utilities, insurance firms, telcos and government departments are regularly criticised for their poor quality of customer service – from their billing systems, to their habit of building their external service delivery around internal business silos – so it’s somewhat encouraging to learn that one local bank is attempting to address this by providing one customer contact person from start to finish. We can only hope that the idea of consistency and continuity of service will catch on.

 

Digital transactions hold the key for Australia Post

Last week’s news that Australia Post is shedding jobs made unwelcome reading for the 900 unfortunate employees who are affected, and the recent proposal to restructure (combined with the implicit risk to rural postal services) has generated some highly charged media commentary and prompted very passionate customer responses.

My personal view is that Australia Post will have to maintain a commitment to letter delivery as part of its protected monopoly obligations. But a “user pays” model that results in higher charges for a “premium” postal service may fail to offset losses from standard snail mail – because businesses will make greater use of existing document exchange and courier services, and retail customers will prefer to receive their utility bills and bank statements by e-mail or other digital solutions such as mobile apps.

Australia Post faces a dual challenge, quite apart from the decline in its letter business (which is rightly seen as a community service, albeit one that should be able to at least cover its costs). First, although it has diversified with a range of products and services, there is very little cohesion across its individual lines of business, and nearly all of them face strong competition, and/or rely on external service providers. Also, according to one software developer I spoke to several months ago, the sheer number of available services meant that some customer service staff did not have sufficient product knowledge and needed an in-house app to train them on how to up- and cross-sell these products.

Second, although it is trying to get into digital solutions, it seems late to the party (e.g., the MyPost Digital Mailbox, which has taken about 12 months from initial announcement to market launch). A few years ago, when I was working on a standard business identifier solution for the financial services industry, Australia Post was well placed to leverage its in-house knowledge of business customers (location, size, industry, spending patterns, logistics, etc.) and combine it with a unique entity ID to enhance and upgrade its business CRM database. However, it was unable to incorporate third-party data sources that would have resulted in even greater analytics on business customer behaviour, because the legacy data systems were unable to cooperate (and the teams that ran them unwilling to collaborate…).

Australia Post’s anticipated expansion into financial services hasn’t materialised (the current CEO is a former banker). If Australia Post became an Authorised Depository Institute, it could offer on-line banking services in its own right, giving it an alternative funding source (in addition to, or instead of, issuing corporate bonds that are implicitly guaranteed by the government). Or, in conjunction with relevant partners Australia Post could expand its Load&Go pre-paid VISA card to become a universal stored value card (such as Hong Kong’s Octopus system).

Instead, Australia Post is relying on the current boom in online shopping to drive revenue growth from its parcels and logistics operations. To me, this is a short-sighted strategy.

If digital is the key to future growth (especially for a data-rich business that operates in logistics, communications and payment transaction services), Australia Post should be looking to  provide and expand business and consumer solutions in the following areas:

  • Digital document verification, validation and transmission (to help offset the decline in snail mail)
  • Location-based payment solutions (to leverage its geographic and transactional knowledge of business customers, especially retailers)
  • Update the current post code system to provide more granular customer data to businesses and to streamline delivery and location services (e.g., like the UK’s system of house number and postcode – imagine how that would make life easier for taxi drivers!)
  • Develop off-the-shelf productivity tools for SMEs – such as on-line data forms, CRM, CMS, e-commerce (become the IKEA of small business data apps – rather like flat-pack, self-assembly furniture, many businesses might welcome such a service)

Finally, if Australia Post thinks that parcel services will carry them through, consider this: each time I want to send a parcel overseas, the counter staff have to undertake the following steps:

  • weigh the item
  • calculate the postage (using a cumbersome sequence of drop down menus on their terminal screen)
  • capture some ID information (such as my driver’s license)
  • attach the customs declaration form (which I have manually completed) to the parcel
  • print the postage label and attach it to the parcel
  • attach an “ID sighted” label to the parcel
  • attach an “Air Mail” sticker to the parcel

More steps are involved if I want use any sort of tracking, insurance or express delivery service. What if I could complete an address and customs form label, and print it before I leave home (or at a terminal at the post office)? And what if this label had scannable items, such as the destination address, for easier processing at the counter?

 

 

 

Tools vs Solutions: When does our core offering need to change?

As regular readers of this blog will be aware, recent posts have focussed on digital – content, products, pricing etc.

I’ve also been immersing myself in the digital design process (next step: learn code?) and earlier this month I attended a workshop by a leading digital design studio. While most of the session was devoted to their own particular design methodology (basically, UCD with some fancy footwork) it also revealed that in developing tools to help customers undertake their own design projects, they have become a subscription software business. No doubt, they will continue as a design consultancy, but clearly the core offering is changing.

This shift echoes an analysis of McKinsey Solutions by the Harvard Business Review in late 2013. Basically, it suggested that rather than providing an all-in-one solution (based on black box consulting methodologies and processes), consulting firms are having to unbundle their offering, allowing them to remain relevant and move to more defendable positions in the value chain. In the case of McKinsey Solutions, embedding analytical tools at client sites is a cost-effective way of delivering services, while gaining insights on their customer needs, which in turn allows them to develop enhanced tools.

So it raises the question: Do consultants need to re-think their offering – rather than being solutions providers, should they focus on being enablers? This may seem overly disruptive (and potentially disenfranchising) for the consulting industry; but in the long run it should mean clients become more reliant on value-added solutions that deploy tools that they know, understand and trust (and can use for themselves). It should also mean that clients will want to retain access to these tools as they evolve, because they will be more invested in their development and use.

 

Amazon, Apple, Google: Are they the New Conglomerates?

Are Amazon, Apple and Google the new conglomerates? If so, should we be concerned that these leading digital businesses increasingly resemble ‘old school’ industrial behemoths?

The classic model of a conglomerate generally describes a holding company that either owns or has controlling stakes in a diversified range of operating businesses, often in unrelated industries.

Conglomerates largely went out of fashion in America and Europe in the 1980’s and 1990’s (following an era of acquisitions and asset-stripping in the 1960’s and 1970’s), resulting in leveraged buy-outs, spin-offs and partial IPOs, etc. as owners and investors  realised that the total value of the individual parts was greater than the amalgamated whole. Although some major cross-sectoral mergers and acquisitions did occur after this period (e.g., AOL and Time Warner, Vivendi and Universal) most M&A activity was confined to single industry players, in pursuit of market share, economies of scale and other business synergies.

Despite this trend, various types of conglomerates (grounded in the ‘traditional’ industrial model) still exist – including the Chaebol of South Korea, Japan’s Keiretsu, China’s mega-SOEs, the trading houses of Hong Kong, and the FMCG “House of Brands” that fill our supermarket shelves. The UK-based Virgin Group and India’s Tata Group  represent contemporary examples of ‘old’ conglomerates as they operate across very separate and distinct businesses and industries.

Conglomerates are usually created by a need for vertical/horizontal integration or a basic desire to build diversified revenue streams. Some build on a core competence, then find an opportunity in a seemingly unrelated field – thus a company like General Electric, with deep expertise in power generation, storage and transmission, diversified into financial services as a way to help customers fund the purchase of its products.

Sometimes, conglomerates evolve as a result of financial necessity – Canada’s Thomson Corporation (now Thomson Reuters) once owned interests in North Sea oil and gas alongside its newspapers and media companies, but then divested most of these assets to focus on its publishing businesses across legal, scientific, financial, tax and accounting information.

For a long time, it also owned a vertically integrated travel business in the UK, comprising a charter airline, a package holiday company and a chain of high street travel agents.

As it was explained to me when I first worked for Thomson in the late 1980s, the rationale for this diversification was simply a question of cashflow: most of the information businesses were subscription-based, with revenues usually collected in the 4th quarter. Although summer package holidays generated a far lower margin than the information businesses, customers paid up front – normally in the 1st quarter, and up to 6 months in advance, creating more consistent cash flows across the business.

At times, conglomerates may need to diversify into new geographic or sectoral markets to avoid anti-trust measures if they come to dominate a particular territory or industry. However, as we have seen in recent years (Microsoft, EMI, Thomson Reuters) anti-trust measures have been used to force divestment or corporate restructures, across jurisdictions and markets.

Whether they have done so by design or by default, the case can be made that Amazon, Apple and Google have become the new conglomerates. Let’s take each in turn:

Amazon – began as an on-line retailer of hard-copy books, and has since moved into sales and distribution of digital content (books, films, music, games, software); a trading and sourcing platform for a wide range of consumer products; an electronics manufacturer (Kindle); cloud computing and data hosting services; and its own branded credit cards.

Apple – originally a manufacturer of personal computers and proprietary operating systems, now a vertically integrated digital content distribution business; a bricks and mortar retailer; a smart phone manufacturer; a key platform for the capture, creation and playback of audio-visual content (with a growing presence in broadcast television); a provider of cloud services; and now exploring opportunities in the automotive sector.

Google – what was once a late-entrant to on-line search has probably become the closest of these three internet giants to being a ‘true’ industrial conglomerate. In addition to its e-mail and social network offerings, Google has developed its own mobile device operating system (Android) and web browser (Chrome), plus smart phones (Nexus) and laptops (Chromebook). It rivals both Apple (most notably in mobile phones and apps distribution) and Amazon (principally for ebook distribution), and is making inroads into Microsoft’s dominance of productivity software. Plus, with Google Cars, Google Goggles (not forgetting Google Maps, Google AdWords, the Google Books Library Project and the 2006 acquisition of YouTube), Google is clearly on a path to being a diversified technology-based business, with integrated businesses across digital content, entertainment, transportation, navigation, archiving, streaming….

Meanwhile, all three have been investing in robotics; and surely telecoms (network carriers), biometrics, renewable energy, education, health, banking and financial services can’t be that far behind.

The risks for these neo-conglomerates are that they will either lose focus, over-reach themselves, or destroy the core businesses that lie at the heart of their success. Worse, they could fall foul of anti-trust provisions if they continue to become vertically and horizontally integrated – a threat equalled only by international moves to call tech-based multinationals to account for their cross-border tax planning.

As with all empires, the fortunes of conglomerates tend to wax and wane, and while the three companies discussed here have remained close to their core businesses, it will be interesting to see how each of them ensures that they continue to add value while not stretching the boundaries of their capabilities.