Category Archives: Business Models

Tools vs Solutions: When does our core offering need to change?

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As regular readers of this blog will be aware, recent posts have focussed on digital – content, products, pricing etc.

I’ve also been immersing myself in the digital design process (next step: learn code?) and earlier this month I attended a workshop by a leading digital design studio. While most of the session was devoted to their own particular design methodology (basically, UCD with some fancy footwork) it also revealed that in developing tools to help customers undertake their own design projects, they have become a subscription software business. No doubt, they will continue as a design consultancy, but clearly the core offering is changing.

This shift echoes an analysis of McKinsey Solutions by the Harvard Business Review in late 2013. Basically, it suggested that rather than providing an all-in-one solution (based on black box consulting methodologies and processes), consulting firms are having to unbundle their offering, allowing them to remain relevant and move to more defendable positions in the value chain. In the case of McKinsey Solutions, embedding analytical tools at client sites is a cost-effective way of delivering services, while gaining insights on their customer needs, which in turn allows them to develop enhanced tools.

So it raises the question: Do consultants need to re-think their offering – rather than being solutions providers, should they focus on being enablers? This may seem overly disruptive (and potentially disenfranchising) for the consulting industry; but in the long run it should mean clients become more reliant on value-added solutions that deploy tools that they know, understand and trust (and can use for themselves). It should also mean that clients will want to retain access to these tools as they evolve, because they will be more invested in their development and use.

 

Amazon, Apple, Google: Are they the New Conglomerates?

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Are Amazon, Apple and Google the new conglomerates? If so, should we be concerned that these leading digital businesses increasingly resemble ‘old school’ industrial behemoths?

The classic model of a conglomerate generally describes a holding company that either owns or has controlling stakes in a diversified range of operating businesses, often in unrelated industries.

Conglomerates largely went out of fashion in America and Europe in the 1980’s and 1990’s (following an era of acquisitions and asset-stripping in the 1960’s and 1970’s), resulting in leveraged buy-outs, spin-offs and partial IPOs, etc. as owners and investors  realised that the total value of the individual parts was greater than the amalgamated whole. Although some major cross-sectoral mergers and acquisitions did occur after this period (e.g., AOL and Time Warner, Vivendi and Universal) most M&A activity was confined to single industry players, in pursuit of market share, economies of scale and other business synergies.

Despite this trend, various types of conglomerates (grounded in the ‘traditional’ industrial model) still exist – including the Chaebol of South Korea, Japan’s Keiretsu, China’s mega-SOEs, the trading houses of Hong Kong, and the FMCG “House of Brands” that fill our supermarket shelves. The UK-based Virgin Group and India’s Tata Group  represent contemporary examples of ‘old’ conglomerates as they operate across very separate and distinct businesses and industries.

Conglomerates are usually created by a need for vertical/horizontal integration or a basic desire to build diversified revenue streams. Some build on a core competence, then find an opportunity in a seemingly unrelated field – thus a company like General Electric, with deep expertise in power generation, storage and transmission, diversified into financial services as a way to help customers fund the purchase of its products.

Sometimes, conglomerates evolve as a result of financial necessity – Canada’s Thomson Corporation (now Thomson Reuters) once owned interests in North Sea oil and gas alongside its newspapers and media companies, but then divested most of these assets to focus on its publishing businesses across legal, scientific, financial, tax and accounting information.

For a long time, it also owned a vertically integrated travel business in the UK, comprising a charter airline, a package holiday company and a chain of high street travel agents.

As it was explained to me when I first worked for Thomson in the late 1980s, the rationale for this diversification was simply a question of cashflow: most of the information businesses were subscription-based, with revenues usually collected in the 4th quarter. Although summer package holidays generated a far lower margin than the information businesses, customers paid up front – normally in the 1st quarter, and up to 6 months in advance, creating more consistent cash flows across the business.

At times, conglomerates may need to diversify into new geographic or sectoral markets to avoid anti-trust measures if they come to dominate a particular territory or industry. However, as we have seen in recent years (Microsoft, EMI, Thomson Reuters) anti-trust measures have been used to force divestment or corporate restructures, across jurisdictions and markets.

Whether they have done so by design or by default, the case can be made that Amazon, Apple and Google have become the new conglomerates. Let’s take each in turn:

Amazon – began as an on-line retailer of hard-copy books, and has since moved into sales and distribution of digital content (books, films, music, games, software); a trading and sourcing platform for a wide range of consumer products; an electronics manufacturer (Kindle); cloud computing and data hosting services; and its own branded credit cards.

Apple – originally a manufacturer of personal computers and proprietary operating systems, now a vertically integrated digital content distribution business; a bricks and mortar retailer; a smart phone manufacturer; a key platform for the capture, creation and playback of audio-visual content (with a growing presence in broadcast television); a provider of cloud services; and now exploring opportunities in the automotive sector.

Google – what was once a late-entrant to on-line search has probably become the closest of these three internet giants to being a ‘true’ industrial conglomerate. In addition to its e-mail and social network offerings, Google has developed its own mobile device operating system (Android) and web browser (Chrome), plus smart phones (Nexus) and laptops (Chromebook). It rivals both Apple (most notably in mobile phones and apps distribution) and Amazon (principally for ebook distribution), and is making inroads into Microsoft’s dominance of productivity software. Plus, with Google Cars, Google Goggles (not forgetting Google Maps, Google AdWords, the Google Books Library Project and the 2006 acquisition of YouTube), Google is clearly on a path to being a diversified technology-based business, with integrated businesses across digital content, entertainment, transportation, navigation, archiving, streaming….

Meanwhile, all three have been investing in robotics; and surely telecoms (network carriers), biometrics, renewable energy, education, health, banking and financial services can’t be that far behind.

The risks for these neo-conglomerates are that they will either lose focus, over-reach themselves, or destroy the core businesses that lie at the heart of their success. Worse, they could fall foul of anti-trust provisions if they continue to become vertically and horizontally integrated – a threat equalled only by international moves to call tech-based multinationals to account for their cross-border tax planning.

As with all empires, the fortunes of conglomerates tend to wax and wane, and while the three companies discussed here have remained close to their core businesses, it will be interesting to see how each of them ensures that they continue to add value while not stretching the boundaries of their capabilities.

Pricing for the Digital Age – A Postscript

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Last week I wrote about pricing for digital content. In the past, I’ve also written about geo-blocking.

So, I decided to conduct a (very) small experiment in price comparison by market territory.

I chose a specific book title, and compared prices of the digital and print editions, between several retail sites, in 3 markets (Australia, UK and USA).

Before I conducted the exercise, my expectation was that Australia would be the most expensive (based on current exchange rates*), and USA the cheapest, but not much cheaper than the UK. But I was surprised by the results….

First, digital version:

Apple’s iTunes store: Australia A$37.99; USA A$37.76; UK A$41.83

Amazon: Australia A$20.60; USA A$20.61; UK A$33.18

eBooks.com: Australia A$40.95; USA A$37.72; UK A$48.03

Booktopia: A$39.95

I was surprised that the iTunes price between Australia and the USA was so close – when it comes to music, iTunes Australia is usually far more expensive than either the USA or UK. Amazon appeared to have the title on sale, but I can’t work out why the UK prices are so much higher. Thanks to geo-blocking, of course, I cannot access the slightly cheaper price in the US store. But I was able to buy it from Amazon.com (and at the same, cheaper price as Amazon.com.au).

Second, print edition (based on shipping costs to/within Australia):

Amazon: Australia not available; USA A$40.89 (inc. P&P to Australia); UK A$50.37 (inc. P&P to Australia)

Book Depository: A$32.31 (inc. P&P from UK)

Angus & Robertson: A$39.99 (inc. P&P within Australia)

Readings: A$40.95 (inc. P&P within Australia)

Booktopia: A$48.45 (inc. P&P within Australia)

Clearly, Book Depository is the best option by far (and is frequently so) and seems willing to undercut its parent company, Amazon – or maybe there’s a deliberate strategy as Amazon.com.au does not yet sell physical products. However, the much higher price charged by Australia’s Booktopia might speak volumes about the state of local retail….

 

NOTE:

Prices were converted from the published local price on each website, then converted to A$ using xe.com

 

 

Pricing for the Digital Age

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Understanding the 4 Ps of marketing (Product, Price, Place, Promotion) has traditionally been critical to commercial success.

Theory has it that if you produce the right product for your target market, at the right price, make it available in the right place, and give it the right promotion, the market will buy it.

The model has worked well for both goods and services. But how is the model holding up in the digital arena?

In the Digital Age, a combination of technology, different transaction models and new marketing tools means that the Product (content), Place (internet) and Promotion (social media) not only co-exist, they are so inter-twined that in some cases they are almost one and the same thing: for example, a Justin Bieber video clip on Vevo, an in-app purchase for Angry Birds, BBC news headlines on Twitter. The boundaries are blurred between the content, the means of production, and the point of distribution and promotion.

So, how do content providers approach Pricing? If that’s the main point of differentiation, how do they compete on price (even though we sort of know that competing on price alone is often a race to the bottom, where nobody wins)?

In fact, even though the price of digital content sold via services like iTunes and Google Play is set by the content owner, they generally have to price according to set price bands and at specific price points determined by the retail platform – and often for particular territories (thanks to the practice of geo-blocking). The alternatives are to sell direct (which means creating a separate sales and distribution infrastructure) or via 3rd party platforms (which may not have the market presence of iTunes or Google Play).

With so much content available for “free” (as long as customers are willing to submit certain personal information, or are prepared to tolerate advertising) the current wisdom suggests that you have to give (some) content away in order to attract customers who might be willing to pay for it (over time). But is that a long-term strategy for success?

In my experience, pricing in the Digital Age is all about the 4 As:

  • Actual Costs – what are the costs of design, development, production and distribution (plus overheads)?
  • Acquisition Costs – what does it take to get new customers (and not just “followers” and “likes”)?
  • Adhesion Costs – what makes content “sticky” (and what will it take to keep your customers once they start paying)? Is it frequent new content? Is it service quality? Is it establishing brand loyalty?
  • Alternative Costs – what choices do your customers have (both traditional and non-traditional competition)? What are the switching costs?

Finally, when competing on price, especially if it’s not a like-for-like comparison, where are the acceptable customer trade-offs between your product and a competing service (e.g., do you know the customer drivers and the purchase decision processes)? What do your customers think they are paying for? Just because you place a high degree of value on some aspect of your content (e.g., exclusivity) does the customer value it the same way?